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THE PASSIVE-AGGRESSIVE VIRTUES: 
COHENS V. VIRGINIA AND THE 
PROBLEMATIC ESTABLISHMENT 
OF JUDICIAL POWER 
Mark A. Graber* 
In his celebrated "Foreword" to the 1961 Harvard Law Re-
view, Alexander Bickel coined the expression "passive virtues" 
to refer to certain jurisdictional doctrines or judicial "techniques" 
for "withholding ultimate constitutional judgment."t Warren 
Court Justices could dodge dangerous political altercations, Felix 
Frankfurter's former clerk declared, by making greater use of 
such devices as denials of certiorari, mootness, ripeness, desue-
tude, and statutory interpretation when they were confronted 
with seemingly intractable constitutional controversies. Bickel 
urged the use of these "passive virtues" for both normative and 
pragmatic reasons. Federal Justices should hesitate before invali-
dating the policies preferred by the people's elected representa-
tives, he insisted, because judicial review was "a deviant 
institution in a democratic society."2 Moreover, Bickel thought 
that prudent Justices rationed judicial rulings on constitutional 
matters in order to protect the Court's scarce political capital. 
Too many controversial decisions would expose "the inner vul-
nerability of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and 
has no earth to draw strength from."3 This need to preserve judi-
cial power justified certain deviations from otherwise binding ca-
nons of legal interpretation. In Bickel's view, Justices could 
strive for convenient results rather than doctrinal consistency 
only when they chose to avoid making constitutional decisions. 
"[T]he techniques and allied devices for staying the Court's 
hand," he concluded, "cannot themselves be principled in the 
• Assistant Professor of Government, University of Maryland. Thanks to Wayne 
Mcintosh, Eric Uslaner and Jim Gimpel for their advice and help. 
1. Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961). 
2. Id. at 47. 
3. Id. at 75. 
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sense in which we have a right to expect adjudications on the 
merits to be principled."4 
The Marshall Court made substantial use of similar legal 
techniques, which I describe as the "passive-aggressive" virtues. 
Federal Justices in the early nineteenth century frequently ex-
pounded on the constitutional controversies that divided the new 
nation, even when such expositions were not strictly relevant to 
the ultimate outcome of the case they were adjudicating. Con-
temporaries and future commentators note how Chief Justice 
John Marshall frequently "went out of his way" to discuss consti-
tutional "issues not necessarily presented" by the fact situation 
before the Court.s Thomas Jefferson, in particular, complained 
bitterly that the "practice of John Marshall, of travelling out of 
his case to prescribe what the law would be in a moot case not 
before the court, is very irregular and censurable."6 Nevertheless, 
anticipating Bickel's institutional concerns and recommenda-
tions, the Marshall Court frequently manipulated various federal 
statutes and jurisdictional grants in order to avoid handing down 
blunt judicial challenges to hostile political forces. Although 
Marshall penned many bold constitutional assertions, the tribu-
nal he led hardly ever issued bold judicial orders. Strict Jeffer-
sonians, old Republicans, and Jacksonians may have frequently 
been enraged by the tone of early Supreme Court opinions, but 
Marshall and his brethren rarely reached decisions that these 
political leaders could actually disobey. 
Marbury v. Madison is the best known and quintessential ex-
ample of how the Marshall Court used the passive-aggressive vir-
tues to insulate controversial constitutional claims from direct 
political attack.7 This paper discusses Cohens v. Virginia,s an ad-
4. ld. at 51. 
5. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred 
Years 1789-1888 61, 102 (U. of Chi. Press, 1985). 
6. Jefferson to William Johnson, June 12, 1823. See A Virginian's 'Amphictyon' 
Essays in Gerald Gunther, ed., John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland 55 
(Stanford U. Press, 1969). 
7. The substantive portion of Marbury declared that the Jefferson administration 
was constitutionally obligated to deliver the disputed judicial commission to William Mar-
bury. Marshall's opinion also implicitly condemned the Judiciary Act of 1802, the first 
important piece of legislation passed by the Jeffersonian majority in Congress. The Jus-
tices, however, did not order an unwilling executive to deliver Marbury's commission or 
declare unconstitutional any Jeffersonian measure. Through a dubious reading of both 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 and Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, Marshall ruled 
that the Supreme Court lacked the necessary jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus 
that Marbury had requested. Significantly, the order in which Marshall resolved the legal 
issues presented by Marbury violates traditional judicial practice. Common law conven-
tions dictate that a court without jurisdiction should simply deny jurisdiction and not ex-
press opinions on the merits of the case. Thus, as Jefferson repeatedly pointed out, the 
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ditional, less appreciated, instance of the passive-aggressive vir-
tues in action. In the face of a sharp challenge from Virginia, the 
Marshall Court unanimously held that persons convicted of state 
crimes could appeal that judgment in federal courts. The Justices 
also ruled that the supremacy clause barred states from interfer-
ing in any way with congressional efforts to govern the District of 
Columbia. Nevertheless, in the spirit of Marbury, the Justices 
upheld a state court decision that fined two Maryland entrepre-
neurs for selling tickets to a congressionally sanctioned lottery. 
Although the Court decided every constitutional issue against 
the Old Dominion, the Justices ruled that the federal law author-
izing the lottery did not preempt Virginia's ban on the sale of 
out-of-state lottery tickets. By adopting a highly implausible 
reading of the legislation establishing the Grand National Lot-
tery, Marshall's opinion managed to conclude that congress had 
preliminary discussion of Marbury's right to a judicial commission was "obiter dictum," 
commentary not necessary to the actual resolution of the case. Jefferson to Hay July 2, 
1807; Jefferson to Johnson, June 12, 1823, Jefferson to Jarvis August 28, 1820. See Charles 
Warren, 1 The Supreme Coun in United States History 244-45, 249-55 (new and revised 
edition) (Little, Brown, and Company, 1926); Max Lerner, John Marshall and the Cam-
paign of History, 39 Colum. L. Rev. 396 (1939); Charles Grove Haines, Histories of the 
Supreme Coun of the United States Wrinen From the Federalist Point of View, 4 The Sw. 
Pol. & Soc. Sci. Q. at 24(1923). For further discussion of Marshall's unusual proceedings 
in Marbury, see, e.g., James M. O'Fallon, The Case of Benjamin More: A Lost Episode in 
the Struggle over Repeal of the 1801 Judiciary Act, 11 Law and History Rev. 43 (1983); 
Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 Tx. L. Rev. 373, 389 (1982); Lerner, 39 Colum. L. 
Rev. 396,408 ("every part of its [Marbury's) reasoning has been repudiated even by con-
servative commentators and by later Supreme Court decisions"); William Van Alstyne, A 
Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Duke LJ. 1; Susan Low Bloch and Maeva 
Marcus, John Marshall's Selective Use of History in Marbury v. Madison, 1986 Wise. L. 
Rev. 301; Jerry J. Phillips, Marbury v. Madison and Section 13 of the Judiciary Act, 60 
Tenn. L. Rev. 51 (1992); Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Coun at 66-69 (cited in 
note 5); George Lee Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, Foundations of Power: John Mar-
shal~ 1801-1815 at 199-201 (MacMillan, 1981). Marbury is not the only instance in which 
Marshall Court Justices denied jurisdiction, but expressed an opinion on the merits of the 
case. In 1809, Marshall declared that the Court would not decide Fletcher v. Peck because 
of a procedural defect, but he nevertheless indicated that he believed the Georgia statute 
at issue to be unconstitutional. C. Peter Magrath, Yazoo: Law and Politics in the New 
Republic: The Case ofF1etcher v. Peck, 65-66 (Brown U. Press, 1966). Similarly, in Cher-
okee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831), Marshall denied jurisdiction while making 
known publicly his support of the Cherokees on the merits. Cherokee Nation, at 15-16. 
Marshall also encouraged Justices Story and Thompson to issue dissenting opinions that 
clearly demonstrated that a judicial majority would support the Cherokees in a properly 
presented case. See Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and 
Morality, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 500, 516-18 (1969); Richard E. Ellis, The Union at Risk: Jackso-
nian Democracy, States' Rights and the Nullification Crisis 30 (Oxford U. Press, 1987); 
Dwight Wiley Jessup, Reaction and Accommodation: The United States Supreme Coun 
and Political Conflict 1809-1835 375-66 (Garland Publishing, 1987); G. Edward White, 
The Marshall Coun & Cultural Change (abridged edition) 724-30 (Oxford, 1991). 
8. 19 u.s. 264 (1821). 
70 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 12:67 
not intended to authorize the sale of lottery tickets outside of the 
nation's capital. 
Following Marshall, commentators have assumed that the 
last part of Cohens is devoted to an uninteresting discussion of 
the precise statutory powers Congress vested in the Corporation 
of Washington. Hence, the last eight pages of Marshall's Cohens 
opinion have received no scholarly attention.9 In fact, the sub-
stantive part of the Cohens opinion conceals major constitutional 
issues that were central concerns of the Marshall Court. Vir-
ginia's effort to ban out-of-state lotteries was similar, if not iden-
tical, to Maryland's effort to tax out-of-state banks. Marshall's 
contemporaries were well aware of the constitutional connec-
tions between Cohens and McCulloch v. Maryland. Leading law-
yers, including Attorney General William Wirt, publicly 
condemned the Cohens prosecution as inconsistent with the prin-
ciples of national supremacy declared in the national bank case. 
By misrepresenting both Virginia and federal law, however, Mar-
shall managed to decide Cohens in favor of Virginia without hav-
ing to explain why Virginia could ban out-of-state lotteries, but 
Maryland could not tax out-of-state banks. 
The Marshall Court's use of the passive-aggressive virtues 
suggests a new understanding of how and whether political con-
siderations influenced that tribunal. Marshall's manipulation of 
Virginia and federal law in Cohens supports claims that he and 
his brethren were willing to twist legal authorities to reach prede-
termined results. As noted below,to Marshall could sustain Vir-
ginia's ban on the sale of out-of-state lotteries only by ignoring 
both the form and substance of his McCulloch opinion. There-
sults the Marshall Court sought to achieve, however, were not 
always the policies preferred by the Adams wing of the Federalist 
party or the Nationalist wing of the Democratic-Republican coa-
lition. In Cohens and Marbury, the court strained legal texts and 
precedents to reach judicial rulings that by their very nature 
could not be disobeyed by hostile political forces. Just as schol-
ars believe that Marshall manipulated the Judiciary Act of 1789 
9. "No scholarly attention," in this case, means no scholarly attention. A Lexus 
search found no discussion of whether the Cohens Court correctly decided that Virginia 
had the constitutional power to ban the Grand National Lottery. The lengthy discussions 
of Cohens in White, The Marshall Court & Cultural Change at 504-24 (cited in note 7), 
Albert J. Beveridge, 4 The Life of John Marshall 342-57 (Houghton Mifflin, 1919), W. 
Ray Luce, Cohens v. Vrrginia (182I): The Supreme Court and State Rights, A Reevaluation 
of Influences and Impacts (Garland Publishing, 1990), and Warren, The Supreme c;ourt in 
United States History at 547-52 (cited in note 7), are also devoted almost exclustvely to 
jurisdictional issues. 
10. See footnotes 83-98 and the relevant text. 
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to avoid ordering Jefferson to hand over William Marbury's judi-
cial commission, so Marshall seems to have deliberately misread 
federal law in order to avoid overturning Vrrginia's ban on the 
sale of out-of-state lottery tickets. 
The Marshall Court's decision to sustain the Virginia law at 
issue in Cohens also calls into question basic assumptions about 
the development of judicial power in the United States. Consti-
tutional historians and theorists blithely assume that the Marshall 
Court established the power to declare laws unconstitutional in 
Marbury and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.tt Cohens, in conven-
tional analyses, was the decision that marked the end of the pro-
cess by which judicial review was placed on a firm footing,tz a 
"powerful answer," in Albert Beveridge's words, to opponents of 
federal judicial power.13 In fact, the Cohens opinion bespeaks a 
tribunal painfully aware that it lacked the political power neces-
sary to declare laws unconstitutional. As used by the Marshall 
Court in Cohens and Marbury, the passive-aggressive virtues 
were the means by which judicial power could be asserted with-
out actually being exercised. Thus, when scholars look at what 
the Marshall Court did in Cohens and other cases instead of what 
the Justices said, the evidence indicates that judicial review was 
not well established by 1821. In what sense, after all, can a court 
be thought to possess the power to declare laws unconstitutional 
when the Justices consistently distort legal texts to get results that 
will not have to be enforced? 
I. THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
The contemporary neglect of Cohens stems partly from the 
apparent political insignificance of the case. Marbury, McCul-
loch, Gibbons v. Ogden, and other Marshall Court decisions 
played prominent roles in the central partisan and economic 
struggles of the early nineteenth century. Cohens, by compari-
son, seems to involve little more than two obscure entrepreneurs 
who were fined $100 for violating a minor state law.t4 Citizens of 
the early American republic, however, recognized that the Vir-
ginia ban on out-of-state lotteries and the Grand National Lot-
11. 14 u.s. 304 (1816). 
12. See footnote 109 and the relevant text. 
13. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall at 343 (cited in note 9). 
14. See Leonard W. Levy, Marshall Coun, 1801-1835, in Levy, Karst and Mahoney, 
eels., Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 72 (MacMillan Publishing, 1986) ("trivial 
question"); Benjamin F. Wright, The Growth of American Constitutional Law 40 (U. of 
Chi. Press, 1967); Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall at 342 (cited in note 9) 
("insignificant"). 
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tery were important governmental policies. The stakes in Cohens 
were the future of Washington D.C. and the scope of congres-
sional power over the new nation's capital. These issues were 
vigorously debated by the leading politicians and lawyers of the 
time. Indeed, the lawyers who argued Cohens, William Wirt, 
William Pinkney, Daniel Webster, David Ogden, Philip Barbour 
and Alexander Smyth, were at least as distinguished as the attor-
neys who had argued McCulloch two years previously.ts 
The persons responsible for framing and ratifying the consti-
tution intended to make Washington D.C. "the vital center of 
national life. "16 Philip Freneau, an influential journalist of the 
young republic, hoped that Congress would "erect[] a city, which 
like Rome in her glory, may be called the strength of nations, the 
delight of the universe, the birth place of sages, and, if not the 
abode of gods, yet truly the nurse of heroes, statesmen and phi-
losophers.n In order to realize this vision, the nation's capital 
was designed to express basic American political principles. 
Washington, James Sterling Young notes, "was a planned com-
munity ... ; planned for the same larger purpose of securing the 
institutions of power against the influence of historical fortuities; 
the product of that same revolutionary urge ... which had in-
spired the Constitution of 1787. "1s National lawmakers moved 
quickly to ensure that Washington D.C. would embody the spirit 
of the new nation. George Washington devoted much of his 
presidential energies to the development of the capital city that 
bore his name.19 John Adams, in his last annual address, urged 
Congress to "immediately exercise[]" its "powers over the Dis-
trict of Columbia." Repeating verbatim the words in a draft 
speech written by his Secretary of State, John Marshall, the sec-
ond president maintained that the District must be considered 
"as the capital of a great nation advancing with unexampled ra-
pidity in arts in commerce, in wealth and in population."2o 
15. Wirt, Webster and Pinkney argued both cases. 
16. James Sterling Young, The Washington Community 1800-1828 at 17 (Columbia 
U. Press, 1966). 
17. Kenneth R. Bowling, The Creation of Washington, D.C.: The Idea and Location 
of the American Capital at 4-5 and 246 (George Mason U. Press, 1991) (quoting Freneau). 
18. Young, The Washington Community at 1-2 (cited in note 16). See Constance 
McLaughlin Green, Washington: Village and Capita~ 1800-1878 at vii (Princeton U. Press, 
1962). 
19. See Bowling, The Creation of Washington, D.C. at 208-34 (cited in note 17). 
20. John Adams, Fourth Annual Address in James D. Richardson, ed., A Compila-
tion of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1897 at 59 (Government Printing 
Office, 1896). See Marshall to John Adams, November 17, 1800. Although some Old 
Republicans dissented, Congress remained committed to building a worthy capital city 
throughout the first quarter of the nineteenth century. A House Committee in 1810, for 
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Unfortunately, the new nation's capital was chronically short 
of resources of all kinds. As W. Ray Luce notes, "limited popu-
lation and a small tax base made it necessary to tap non-district 
resources. "2t One solution Congress authorized in 1792 was a 
lottery. The first lottery was held in 1793 for "the improvement 
of the Federal City." Tickets were sold to citizens throughout the 
United States. Even George Washington bought a chance.22 In 
1812 and again in 1820, Congress delegated to the Corporation of 
Washington the power to hold lotteries, subject to the approval 
of the President of the United States, "for effecting any impor-
tant improvements in the city."23 Subsequent lotteries, most of 
which failed miserably, were designed to finance the building of 
schools, a city hall, a federal penitentiary and a canal to 
Maryland.24 
This use of lotteries to fund major public projects was a com-
mon political practice in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. As is frequently the case at present, the colonies and 
original states found lotteries a less painful device than taxation 
for extracting necessary revenue from a reluctant citizenry. Lot-
teries helped American communities finance military defenses 
during French and Indian War, build and repair public buildings 
(including the building which housed Congress during the Wash-
ington administration), establish schools, hospitals, poorhouses 
and orphan asylums, organize towns and rebuild cities, raise 
money, and fund internal improvements.25 Purveyors of lottery 
tickets also provided many needed financial services for the cash-
starved early republic. "Lottery offices," Luce points out, "were 
among the most important financial institutions in the nation. 
Much of the nation's capital accumulation came from lotteries, 
and most lottery offices performed a variety of financial and 
banking services. "26 
The good citizens of Virginia proved as susceptible to the 
blandishments of lotteries as other Americans living in the early 
example, noted that "the founding and erection of so extensive a city as the permanent 
seat of empire for the United States, must obviously require the aid of vast resources." 
Green, Washington: Village and Capital at 32 (cited in note 18). 
21. Luce, Cohens v. Virginia at 77 (cited in note 9). On the debt problems of the 
nation's capital, see Green, Washington: Village and Capital at 40, 90 (cited in note 18). 
22. See Ezell, Fortunes's Merry WheeL· The Lottery in America 102 (Harv. U. Press, 
1960). 
23. 3 U.S. Statutes at Large 588 (1820); 2 U.S. Statutes at Large 726 (1812). 
24. For a discussion of Washington's sad experience with lotteries, see Ezell, For-
tune's Merry Wheel at 100-08 (cited in note 22). 
25. Id. at 28-160. 
26. Luce, Cohens v. Virginia at 1 (cited in note 9). 
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national period. Lotteries were used to provide funds for the 
founding of the Virginia colony, educational institutions and civic 
improvements.21 John Ezell's study of early American lotteries 
found that "[i)n both numbers and amounts of grants for internal 
improvements," Virginia "led the nation."28 Prominent Virgini-
ans encouraged these sweepstakes as a means for raising public 
and private revenue. George Washington was an active partici-
pant in several lotteries; Thomas Jefferson relied on a public lot-
tery to save Monticello; Bushrod Washington, Patrick Henry, 
George Mason and George Wythe served as lottery directors.29 
By the late 1810s, the Virginia legislature was authorizing three 
to four lotteries a year.30 
Still, not all Virginians were enchanted by games of chance. 
More religious elements opposed lotteries on principle. Other 
citizens were concerned with shady practices. Suspicion of lotter-
ies heightened in the revolutionary period when the Fairfax inter-
ests won substantial prizes in the Fairfax lottery. Determined to 
prevent future frauds, the Old Dominion in 1769 and in 1779 
passed laws that required all state lotteries to have a variety of 
safeguards to secure prizes and honest dealings.3t Still, such laws 
did little to slow down lottery activity in Virginia. More signifi-
cantly, the Cohen brothers were not convicted for engaging in 
any fraudulent practice. 
Virginians developed more principled objections to lotteries 
when their community did not get its share of the take. Starting 
in 1813, the state passed a series of laws requiring lottery agents 
to pay an ever increasing fee for a license to sell out-of-state lot-
tery tickets.32 In 1819, Virginia enacted a flat ban on out-of-state 
lotteries. "The Last of the Republicans" dutifully informed read-
ers of the Richmond Enquirer that "the act forbidding the sale of 
foreign lottery tickets" would "preserve[) the morals of our peo-
ple from the effects of a pernicious gambling." Still, "The Last of 
the Republicans" and his fellow Virginians were more concerned 
with "preventing the moneys of our people from going into the 
27. See Ezell, Fortune's Merry Wheel at 4-9, 37-38, 64, 72, 78, 115-17, 120, 130-31, 
154-55 (cited in note 22). 
28. Id. at 130. 
29. Id. at 78, 115-16, 168-70. When seeking support for the lottery that would ease 
his debts, Jefferson observed that "between the years 1782 and 1820," he had "obse~ed 
seventy cases, where ~rmission [to hold a lottery] has been found useful, by the legtsla-
ture." Jefferson to Madison, February 17, 1826. 
30. Luce, Cohens v. Virginia at 15-19 (cited in note 9). 
31. ld. at 21-22. 
32. Id. 
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coffers of other states."33 Luce's study of the Cohens case found 
that the Virginia legislature regarded their ban on out-of-state 
lotteries "as necessary to stop a cash outflow that paid for other 
state's internal improvements when similar Virginia projects 
faced financial difficulties. "34 
Six months after the ban on out-of-state lotteries was en-
acted, Philip and Mendes Cohen were arrested for selling tickets 
to the Grand National Lottery in defiance of Virginia's ordi-
nance. A local Virginia Court found the brothers guilty as 
charged and fined them $100. For reasons that may have been 
more political than pecuniary, the Cohens immediately asked the 
United States Supreme Court to void their conviction.3s The Jus-
tices quickly agreed to place that appeal on their docket. Indeed, 
Marshall and his brethren decided to examine whether Virginia 
could ban the sale of D.C. lottery tickets before the Virginia 
court had issued its final ruling in Cohens.36 
The Marshall Court's decision to hear Cohens set off an im-
mediate political firestorm. The Virginia legislature declared 
that federal Justices had "no rightful authority under the Consti-
tution to examine and correct the judgment for which the Com-
monwealth has been cited," and ordered the state lawyers to 
limit their argument before the federal bench to the jurisdictional 
issue.37 Leading Virginia politicians wrote vigorous essays de-
nouncing the Court's attempt to take jurisdiction in Cohens.3s 
Much of the controversy centered on whether the Supreme 
Court had the constitutional jurisdiction necessary to hear ap-
peals from state criminal convictions. Yet, as their relative indif-
ference to the Court's decision in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee 
indicated, Virginians did not get excited over abstract jurisdic-
tional questions when no substantive interest of their state was at 
33. The Last of the Republicans, Richmond Enquirer (Jan. 25, 1821). 
34. Luce, Cohens v. Virginia at 23 (cited in note 9). See White, The Marshall Court 
& Cultural Change at 504 (cited in note 7). 
35. The relatively lenient penalty meted out by the Virginia Court supports sugges-
tions that Cohens was a "feigned" case, set up to test the constitutional reach of the 
congressional power to govern D.C. As Luce notes, Washington lottery tickets consti-
tuted only a small portion of the Cohens' business. Luce, Cohens v. Virginia at 80-81 
(cited in note 9). See Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall at 343, 345-46 (cited in note 
9). Moreover, months after they were fined for selling D.C. lottery tickets, the Cohen 
brothers were freely advertizing the sale of lottery tickets authorized by Maryland in the 
Richmond Enquirer. See Washington Monument Lottery, Richmond Enquirer (Nov. 21, 
1820). 
36. Luce, Cohens v. Virginia at 80-81 (cited in note 9). 
37. White, The Marshall Court & Cultural Change at 505 (cited in note 7); Luce, 
Cohen v. Virginia at 121-22 (cited in note 9); Warren, The Supreme Court in United States 
History at 547-48 (cited in note 7). 
38. Luce, Cohens v. Virginia at 84-87, 93-116 (cited in note 9). 
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stake.39 The Cohens appeal disturbed the Old Dominion because 
Virginians were committed to excluding out-of-state lotteries, 
and more importantly, feared that Congressional power over the 
District of Columbia would be used to limit their state's preroga-
tives. Luce notes that "a virtually unanimous opposition existed 
against the claim that the District lottery law superseded any 
state regulation. "40 A judicial decision overturning the Co hens 
conviction, a state senate committee reported, would "establish[ ] 
the District of Columbia" as "the law giver of the whole 
confederacy. "41 
Virginia's fear that the Court would void their ban on out-
of-state lotteries was well founded. The Niles Register published 
a letter written by the leading lawyers of the early Supreme 
Court Bar which concluded that "the legislature of no individual 
state in the union, can, constitutionally prohibit the sale of tickets 
in the lotteries established in the City of Washington, under the 
authority of congress." "This is a lottery," William Pinkney, 
Thomas Emmet, David B. Ogden, Walter Jones, and John Wells 
declared, "authorized by congress for the purpose of making im-
portant improvements in the city which may be styled the na-
tional city, in the improvement of which the nation is 
concerned." For this reason, the lawyers maintained that "it 
would be monstrous if any state legislature could impede the exe-
cution of a law made for national purposes, relative to a district 
over which the national legislature have the exclusive right of 
legislation. "42 Although Hezekiah Niles purported not to en-
dorse the letter's content,43 his comment in his Niles Register rec-
ognized that the issues before the Court were virtually identical 
to those raised by McCulloch. "The supreme court of the United 
States," Niles opined, "if consistent with its own doctrines about 
the bank, will certainly sanction those maintained in the opinion 
[of the lawyers]. "44 
39. See White, The Marshall Court & Cultural Change at 743-44 (cited in note 7) 
(noting that "newspapers did not find ... the Martin case worth commenting on"); Luce, 
Cohens v. Virginia at 25 (cited in note 9). 
40. Luce, Cohens v. Virginia at 111 (cited in note 9); see The LAst of the Republicans 
(cited in note 33). 
41. Luce, Cohens v. Virginia at 84-87, 92, 97, 100-01, 110, 146-47, 183-184, 229-30 
(cited in note 9). 
42. Niles Register at 3 (Sept. 2, 1820). 
43. Niles Register at 3 (Sept. 2, 1820). Niles did indicate that the constitutionality of 
the Vrrginia ban on the sale of out-of-state lottery tickets pitted "some eminent Lawyers 
in Vrrginia" against "a number of the most eminent lawyers in the United States." Ibid. 
44. Niles Register at 3 (Sept. 2, 1820). On the influence of Niles Register, see Norval 
Neil Luxon, Niles' Weekly Register: News Magazine of the Nineteenth Century (Louisiana 
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Attorney General William Wrrt reiterated these themes 
when defending the national lottery before the Supreme Court. 
The lottery, Wirt informed the Justices, was a consequence of 
"Congress, in its national character, providing the means of ad-
ding necessary improvements to the national capital." The 
supremacy clause of the constitution, he declared, prohibited 
states from interfering with the means the federal government 
had chosen for developing the District of Columbia. As Wirt 
noted, "what Congress in the legitimate exercise of its powers has 
made it lawful to sell, the State cannot make it unlawful to 
buy."4s David Ogden, counsel for the Cohen brothers, also em-
phasized principles identical to those that Chief Justice John 
Marshall laid down two years previous in McCulloch. If, he 
declared, 
Congress have a right to raise a revenue, for any national pur-
pose, by establishing a lottery, they had a right to establish this 
lottery, and no State law can defeat this, any more than the 
exercise of any other national power."46 
Although counsel for Virginia had been instructed by the 
state legislature to limit their argument to the jurisdictional issue, 
Alexander Smyth and Philip Barbour managed to incorporate 
into their presentation an attack on the constitutional reach of 
the Grand National Lottery. Using for jurisdictional cover the 
claim that a law passed "for the local purpose of Washington" 
was not "a law of the United States" under Article 111,47 Vir-
ginia's lawyers told the Justices that Congress had no power to 
force the sale of lottery tickets on unwilling states. "The act of 
Congress under which this lottery has been authorized," Smyth 
declared, "is not an act passed in execution of any of those spe-
cific powers which Congress may exercise over the States."48 In 
his view, "[w]hen Congress legislate exclusively for Columbia, 
they are restrained to objects within the District."49 Should the 
State U. Press, 1947); Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall at 309, 312 (cited in note 9) 
("the most widely read and influential publication in the country"). 
45. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 440 (argument of the Attorney General). See Cohens at 432-
33 (argument of Mr. D.B. Ogden). 
46. Id. at 433 (argument of Mr. D.B. Ogden). Ogden's comment that "[l]ottery tick-
ets are an article of commerce, vendible in every part of the Union," id. at 432 (argument 
of Mr. D.B. Ogden) suggests that he may have thought the Virginia law violated the 
commerce clause. Neither Wirt nor Ogden, however, specifically referred to the com-
merce clause in their argument before the Court. 
47. Id. at 342-44 (argument of Mr. Smyth). 
48. Id. at 332 (argument of Mr. Smyth). 
49. ld. at 336 (argument of Mr. Smyth). 
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Court rule otherwise, Barbour added, Virginia will have "lost all 
power of regulating the conduct of her own citizens. "so 
Barbour and Smyth followed orders and left after the Jus-
tices ruled that federal courts possess the jurisdiction necessary 
to reverse state court convictions, but their departure did not end 
the debate over whether the Cohen brothers had been legally 
fined. The Justices invited Daniel Webster to represent Virginia 
and defend state bans on the sale of D.C. lottery tickets. Web-
ster, in the least nationalistic presentation of his career, reiter-
ated the states' rights position that Congress had no 
constitutional power to force lottery tickets on unwilling states. 
Unlike Barbour and Smyth, however, Webster offered a statu-
tory defense of Virginia's policy. Making a claim that had only 
been hinted at previously, Webster insisted that the Cohen broth-
ers were not protected by federal law. Congress, he claimed, had 
not intended that D.C. lottery tickets be sold outside of 
Washington.s1 
II. THE DECISION 
The main body of Cohens declared that states enjoy no sov-
ereign immunity from federal judicial processes. The Marshall 
Court unanimously ruled that "a case arising under the constitu-
tion or laws of the United States, is cognizable in the Courts of 
the Union, whoever may be the parties to that case."sz Contrary 
to a literal reading of Article III, Section 2s3 and explicit state-
ments in Marbury,s4 the Justices found that Congress could con-
stitutionally vest the Supreme Court with the power to hear 
50. ld. at 296 (argument of Mr. Barbour). 
51. Cohens at 434-37. One wonders whether Webster was invited to participate in 
Cohens in part because he willingly emphasized a non-constitutional grounds for uphold-
ing Virginia's ban on out-of state lotteries. The Marshall Court did not solicit substitute 
counsel in Marbury and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), when government offi-
cials failed to make an appearance. 
52. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 383. See Cohens at 3TI-92. 
53. "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and 
those in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. 
In all other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, 
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Con-
gress shall make." 
54. Marbury, at 174 ("if congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate juris-
diction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and origi-
nal jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution 
of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance"), at 175 ("the plain 
import of the words seems to be, that in one class of cases its jurisdiction is original, and 
not appellate; in the other it is appellate, and not original"). 
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appeals from cases in which a state was a party.ss The Chief Jus-
tice also examined and brusquely rejected Virginia's claim that 
the Eleventh Amendment prohibited federal courts from adjudi-
cating an appeal from two citizens of Maryland who were con-
victed of a criminal offense by a Virginia Court. The 
constitutional ban on extending " [ t )he Judicial power of the 
United States ... to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of an-
other State," he ruled, did not bar federal jurisdiction when a 
state initiated a suit or criminal prosecution against a citizen of 
another state.s6 Finally, Marshall reaffirmed the judicial power 
to declare state laws unconstitutional that Justice Story had pre-
viously defended in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. Letting localities 
resolve constitutional controversies for themselves, his unani-
mous opinion asserted, "would prostrate ... the government and 
its laws at the feet of every state" by giving "each member ... a 
veto on the will of the whole. "57 
The Cohens Court also endorsed Attorney General Wirt's 
broad construction of the congressional power over the District 
of Columbia. All exercises of that power, the Justices held, were 
federal laws "bind[ing] all the United States."ss Thus, Congress 
had the authority to enforce throughout the nation the rules it 
made for the governance and improvement of the nation's capi-
tal. "The act incorporating the City of Washington," Marshall 
wrote, "is, unquestionably, of universal obligation."s9 For this 
reason, the Chief Justice and his brethren insisted that all con-
gressional efforts to improve the District of Columbia preempted 
inconsistent state laws. Any attempt by a "State to defeat the 
loan authorized by Congress" for financing public buildings in 
the nation's capital, they declared, "would have been void."60 
Nevertheless, although the Supreme Court rejected every 
constitutional argument that Virginia's lawyers presented, the 
Justices sustained Virginia's ban on the sale of out-of-state lot-
tery tickets. Interpreting the 1812 Amendments to the charter of 
the City of Washington as Webster had suggested, Marshall's 
unanimous opinion held that Congress had not intended to re-
55. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 392-405. For discussions of the conflict between Marbury and 
Cohens, see Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court at 100-01 (cited in note 5); 
White, The Marshall Court & Cultural Change at 516 (cited in note 7). 
56. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 405-12. 
57. ld. at 385, 413-23. 
58. ld. at 424. 
59. ld. at 447. 
60. ld. 
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quire lottery sales outside of the District of Columbia. In order 
to reach this dubious conclusion, Marshall painted a deceptive 
picture of Virginia policy and ignored the history of lotteries in 
the nation's capital. Moreover, both the form and substance of 
the Cohens opinion differ dramatically from Marshall's McCul-
loch opinion penned two years earlier. Had Marshall in McCul-
loch reasoned from the principles that he used in Cohens to 
demonstrate that Congress did not intend to authorize ticket 
sales in unwilling states, the Chief Justice would have sustained 
Maryland's power to tax the national bank. 
A. CoHENS AND THE LoiTERY 
The Marshall Court maintained that Congress regarded the 
governance of Washington as "a local subject," and hence, did 
not authorize the sale of lottery tickets outside the District of 
Columbia. Implicitly recanting his previous assertion that Con-
gress must consider the District of Columbia "as the capital of a 
great nation" when governing that metropolitan center,61 Mar-
shall repeatedly described the powers granted to the Corporation 
of Washington as "local in nature." His opinion in Cohens in-
sisted that "[t]he proceeds of these lotteries ... are raised by laws 
whose operation is entirely local, and for objects which are also 
local."62 Restricting the lottery to the nation's capital would not 
doom the lottery to failure, in his view. "[T]he City of Washing-
ton," Cohens proclaimed, was "the great metropolis of the na-
tion, visited by individuals, from every part of the Union. "63 
Marshall also claimed that the very text of the statute authorizing 
the lottery demonstrated that Congress did not believe the lot-
tery would have any "extra-territorial operations. "64 "Had Con-
gress intended to establish a lottery for those improvements in 
the City which are deemed national," he stated, "the lottery itself 
would have become the subject of legislative consideration. "65 
Instead of being entrusted to a private corporation, Marshall 
continued, the lottery "would be organized by law, and agents for 
its execution would be appointed by the President, or in such 
other manners as the law might direct. "66 
History confounds Marshall's repeated assertion that the 
congress which sanctioned the Grand National Lottery thought a 
61. See notes 22 and 27 and relevant text. 
62. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 446. 
63. Id. at 444. 
64. Id. at 442. 
65. Id. at 445. 
66. Id. See generally, Cohens, 19 U.S. at 446-47. 
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measure so named was nevertheless a local affair.67 As noted 
above,68 early American political leaders believed that the devel-
opment of their nation's capital was a vital national concern. 
Hence, even efforts to raise funds for the most pedestrian civic 
purposes were considered of national importance. Moreover, the 
Corporation of Washington often used lotteries to raise revenues 
for improvements that were not entirely local. One lottery was 
held to raise money for a federal penitentiary. The Grand Na-
tional Lottery was intended to provide funds for building a canal 
between Maryland and Washington. The proceeds of the first 
lottery held in the nation's capital were earmarked for general 
improvements, without reference to national or local institutions. 
Unlike later lotteries, that lottery was directly authorized by 
Congress. Nevertheless, no evidence exists that the national leg-
islature intended to limit the purposes for which lotteries could 
be used by vesting the power to hold lotteries in the Corporation 
of Washington. Indeed, although the original parties to Cohens 
agreed that "the lottery ... was duly created by the ... Corpora-
tion of Washington,"69 the Grand National Lottery was, in fact, 
directly authorized by Congress on May 6, 1812.7o That counsel 
for Virginia, the Cohen brothers or the United States did not cor-
rect this error suggests either a gross oversight or, more likely, a 
consensual understanding that whatever powers Congress had to 
hold lotteries for the benefit of the District were given in full to 
the Corporation of Washington. 
Persons familiar with the nation's capital in 1819 knew that 
Washington D.C. was not an urban center capable of sustaining 
the Grand National Lottery and its $50,000 worth of advertized 
prizes. Few early nineteenth century visitors used Marshall's 
words, "the great metropolis of the nation," to describe that capi-
tal city. Rather, as one commentator notes, "Washington ... was 
then a new, raw, unfinished, swampy village of vexing vistas, ... 
and few of the citizens could afford to meet the requirements of 
the building code. "n Charles Dickens described "spacious ave-
nues that begin in nothing and lead nowhere; streets, mile long, 
67. The Cohens opinion never mentions the Grand National Lottery by name. 
68. See notes 23-27, 49-53 and relevant text. 
69. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 289. 
70. 2 U.S. Statutes at Large 728 (1812). See Luce, Cohens v. Virginia at n (cited in 
note 9). (noting that the Cohen brothers were arrested for selling tickets to a lottery 
directly authorized by Congress); Ezell, Fonune's Merry Wheel at 106 (cited in note 22). 
71. M~rshall Smesler, The Democratic Republic, 1801-1815 23 (Harper & Row, 
1968); Haskms and Johnson, Foundations of Power at 74-78 (cited in note 7). 
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that only want houses, roads, and inhabitants."n The nation's 
capital in 1800 had fewer than 400 residences, most of which 
were "small miserable huts," and only 233 residents had a net 
worth of more than $1(}().73 Most of the immigrants to that city in 
the following years were "indigent ... , their hopes fastened on a 
merciful sovereign, a bountiful treasury, and public jobs."74 
These citizens obviously could not buy enough tickets to guaran-
tee that the Grand National Lottery and other such ventures 
would be profitable. National officials and visiting dignitaries 
were also unlikely marks for lottery vendors. Persons with offi-
cial business in the nation's capital typically left immediately af-
ter, if not before, their duties were finished.1s For these reasons, 
the Court's decision to let Virginia ban the sale of D.C. lottery 
tickets was one of several events that forced Congress to aban-
don lotteries as a means of raising revenue.76 
Marshall must also have known that Congress had no 
qualms about authorizing private associations to raise money for 
national projects. Communities in the young republic routinely 
farmed out to private corporations the power to make public im-
provements. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge77 assumed 
national importance, in part, because most civic enterprises in the 
new nation were performed by private corporations with special 
charters from local governments.1s The national government was 
similarly willing to delegate important public powers to private 
parties. Marshall's opinion in McCulloch sustained congressional 
power to vest a private corporation with the power to control the 
nation's money supply. If ultimate control is the defining feature 
of a corporation, then the Bank of the United States was signifi-
cantly more private than the Corporation of Washington. The 
President had the right to veto any lottery proposed by Washing-
ton officials, but the national government could select only 
twenty percent of the persons who sat on the Board of the na-
tional bank.79 
72. Charles Dickens, American Notes and Pictures from Italy 116 (Oxford U. Press, 
1957); David L. Lewis, District of Columbia: A Bicentennial History 15-19 (W.W. Norton 
& Company, 1976); Young, The Washington Community at 21-26,41-48 (cited in note 16). 
73. Young, The Washington Community at 22, 26 (cited in note 16). 
74. Id. at 25-26. 
75. Id. at 47-57. 
76. Ezell, Fortune's Merry Wheel at 106 (cited in note 22). 
77. 36 u.s. 420 (1837). 
78. Stanley I. Kutler, Privilege and Creative Destruction: The Charles River Bridge 
Case (lippincott, 1971). 
79. An Act further to amend the Charter of the City of Washington, 2 U.S. Statutes 
at Large 721, 726 (1812); An Act to Incorporate the Subscribers to the Bank of the 
United States, 3 U.S. Statutes at Large 266, 269-70 (1816). 
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B. CoHENS AND McCuLLOCH 
The Marshall Court ignored more basic commonalities be-
tween Cohens and McCulloch than the congressional willingness 
to vest the Bank of the United States and the Corporation of 
Washington with important public powers. The Virginia law at 
issue in Cohens was virtually identical in form to the Maryland 
law at issue in McCulloch. Both Maryland and Virginia sought to 
insulate local practices from out-of-state competition. Maryland 
taxed all banks not chartered by that state. Virginia prohibited 
the sale of all lottery tickets not approved by the state. Neither 
state singled out national financial institutions for special treat-
ment.so The federal laws authorizing the national bank and 
Grand National Lottery were also identical in one important re-
spect. Both measures failed to specify when or whether the fed-
eral policies they established preempted inconsistent state 
legislation. Nevertheless, Marshall painted a very different pic-
ture of the laws that were challenged in McCulloch and Cohens, 
and the issues those laws raised. 
The Marshall Court mischaracterized Virginia's law as a 
general ban on lotteries and Maryland's law as a specific attack 
on the Bank of the United States. Cohens describes the Virginia 
ban on the sale of out-of-state lottery tickets as "a law to punish 
the sale of lottery tickets in Virginia,"s1 and a "penal law[ 1 of a 
State, ... not levelled against the legitimate powers of the Union, 
but hav[ing1 for (its 1 sole object the internal government of the 
country."82 Nowhere did Marshall indicate that the Virginia law 
was not a law of general application, but a measure specifically 
directed against the efforts of other jurisdictions to raise needed 
revenues. McCulloch, by comparison, explicitly asserts that 
Maryland's banking policies were "levelled against the legitimate 
powers of the Union." "(T]his is a tax on the operations of the 
bank," the Chief Justice declared, "and is, consequently, a tax on 
the operation of an instrument employed by the government of 
the Union to carry its powers into execution."s3 Just as Mar-
shall's Cohens opinion never hints that Virginia banned only out-
80. Dwight Jessup suggests that Maryland's tax on out-of-state banks was intended 
to protect local banks and was not designed to discriminate specifically against the na-
tional bank. State restrictions on "foreign" banks passed after the summer of 1818, how-
ever, were directed specifically against the national bank. See Jessup, Reaction and 
Accommodation at 186-87 (cited in note 7). 
81. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 444. 
82. ld. at 443. 
83. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 436-37 
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of state lotteries, so his McCulloch opinion never hints that 
Maryland taxed all out-of-state banks. 
Although the Virginia and Maryland laws at issue in Cohens 
and McCulloch were almost indistinguishable, Marshall an-
swered different legal questions when deciding those two cases. 
His Cohens opinion rests on a question of statutory interpreta-
tion. The Court, Marshall insisted, must first determine whether 
Congress had authorized the Corporation of Washington "to 
force the sale of these lottery tickets in States where such sales 
may be prohibited by law. "84 Because the Justices ruled that the 
Cohen brothers acted without federal statutory authorization, 
they did not consider the extent to which Virginia could constitu-
tionally interfere with Congressional efforts to improve the na-
tion's capital. McCulloch, however, ignored the analogous 
statutory question. At no point did Marshall's opinion discuss 
whether the statute that established the Bank of the United 
States granted that corporation any immunity from state taxa-
tion.ss Instead, the Chief Justice devoted the entire second half 
of McCulloch to the question Cohens deferred, "whether the 
State of Maryland may, without violating the constitution, tax 
that branch [of the national bank]."86 
Marshall's contemporaries recognized that the principles of 
national supremacy that the Justices announced in McCulloch 
should have compelled the Court to declare unconstitutional the 
Virginia law at issue in Cohens.s1 If, as Marshall proclaimed in 
the national bank case, "the States have no power, by taxation or 
otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, 
the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to 
carry into execution the powers vested in the general govem-
ment,"ss then Virginia had no right to ban the sale of tickets to a 
lottery authorized by congress under its power to govern the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Nevertheless, by juxtaposing a statutory ques-
tion in Cohens that McCulloch never considered, Marshall 
managed to decide the former case in favor of Virginia without 
weakening the precedential force of the latter decision. 
Marshall never explained why Virginia could ban congres-
sional lotteries even though Maryland could not tax the national 
84. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 441. 
85. Indeed, McCulloch does not locate the source of the bank's immunity from state 
taxation. See Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court at 165-67 (cited in note 5); 
White, The Marshall Court & Cultural Change at 552 (cited in note 7). 
86. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 425. 
87. See notes 49-53, above, and the relevant text. 
88. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 436. 
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bank. The Justices in Cohens demanded that "the intention" to 
exempt the lottery from state penal laws "be clearly and unequiv-
ocally stated,"s9 but the Court in McCulloch implied that the na-
tional bank enjoyed an immunity from state taxation unless 
Congress said otherwise. The Justices also did not require in sub-
sequent cases that federal legislation plainly forbid local regula-
tion of the same subject matter. In both Gibbons v. Odgen and 
Brown v. Maryland,<JO Marshall voided state laws that were not 
"clearly and unequivocally" banned by national statutes.9t 
Marshall's famous assertion in McCulloch that "the power 
to tax involves the power to destroy"92 does not justify granting 
the national bank any special immunity from hostile state laws. 
The power to prohibit also involves the power to destroy, but the 
Cohens Court implied no immunity from state bans on the sale of 
lottery tickets. Moreover, many early nineteenth century politi-
cians favored a national bank that was subject to some state laws. 
Andrew Jackson insisted that he might have rechartered the 
Bank of the United States had that corporation waived its judi-
cial immunity to all forms of state taxation.93 Fmally, modem 
jurists similarly reject Marshall's claim that "the power to tax in-
volves the power to destroy." Justice Felix Frankfurter described 
the phrase as a "seductive cliche";94 Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., maintained that "[t]he power to tax is not the power 
to destroy while this Court sits. "9s If, as Marshall proclaimed in 
McCulloch, the "court disclaims all pretensions ... to inquire 
into" matters of "degree,"% then his Cohens opinion suggests 
that the federal judiciary should have let Congress determine 
what state taxes the national bank would and would not be ex-
empt from. 
The legal distinctions between Cohens and McCulloch may 
have been tenuous, but the political differences between the two 
cases were clear. President Monroe, ex-President Madison and a 
strong bipartisan legislative coalition were on record as backing 
the Bank of the United States. 1\vo weeks before McCulloch 
89. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 443. 
90. 25 u.s. 419 (1827). 
91. Gibbons, 22 U.S. 1, 209-22 (1822); Brown, 25 U.S. at 446-49; see Robert Ken-
neth Faulkner, The Jurisprudence of John Marshall 86-87 (Princeton U. Press, 1968). 
92. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 431. 
93. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, in James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of 
the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 579-80, 586-88 (Government Printing Office 
1~~ ' 
94. Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 489 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
95. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, zn U.S. 218, 233 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
96. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 423. 
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was handed down, an overwhelming congressional majority de-
feated an attempt to repeal the national bank's charter.97 Mar-
shall recognized that powerful political actors would support a 
judicial decision upholding the national government's power to 
incorporate a bank. Critics of McCulloch, he wrote Justice 
Bushrod Washington, "have no objection to a decision in favor of 
the Bank since the good patriots who administer the government 
wished it, and would probably have been seriously offended with 
us had we dared to have decided otherwise. "9s Indeed, Marshall 
probably knew that Maryland would not challenge an adverse 
decision. McCulloch was an arranged case, litigated with the full 
cooperation of state officials. Governor Charles Ridgley in-
formed the Maryland legislature that he had negotiated "an ami-
cable arrangement" with the bank. If the Supreme Court 
decided the case in favor of Maryland, the bank would cooperate 
fully with Maryland's laws; if Maryland lost, "no further steps 
[would be] taken . . . against the bank. "99 
Marshall had no analogous reason for thinking that Virgini-
ans would respect a decision in favor of the Cohen brothers. Vir-
ginia had already hinted at defiance by instructing counsel in 
Cohens not to argue the merits of their state's ban on the sale of 
out-of-state lottery tickets. National officials would not have in-
sisted that Virginia accept an adverse ruling. "Major losses and 
unmeasurable confusion," Ezell notes, had sapped congressional 
support for lotteries.loo Marshall was aware of the risks inherent 
in challenging Virginia's prerogatives without strong backing 
from the national government. A year after he handed down Co-
hens, Chief Justice found a statutory excuse to avoid voiding Vir-
ginia's ban on the entry of free blacks. "As I am not fond of 
butting against a wall in sport," he informed Story, "I escaped on 
the construction of the act. "1o1 Marshall's contemporaries 
97. See Gerald Gunther, Introduction in Gerald Gunther, ed., John Marshall's De-
fense of McCulloch v. Maryland 4-6 (cited in note 6); Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics 
in America: From the Revolution to the Civil War 251, 259 (Princeton U. Press, 1957); 
A.I.L. Campbell, "It is a constitution we are expounding": Chief Justice Marshall and the 
"necessary and proper" clause, 12 J. of Legal Hist. 190, 199-200, 215-16; Jessup, Reaction 
and Accommodation at 187-91 (cited in note 7); White, The Marshall Court & Cultural 
Change at 544 (cited in note 7). 
98. Marshall to Washington, March 27, 1819 (quoted by Jessup 1987, p. 196). See A 
Virginian's 'Amphictyon' Essays in Gerald Gunther, ed., John Marshall's Defense of Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland at 72 (cited in note 6) ("I am willing to acquiesce in that particular 
case"). 
99. Jessup, Reaction and Accommodation at 191 (cited in note 7). 
100. Ezell, Fortune's Merry Wheel at 106 (cited in note 22). 
101. Marshall to Story, September 26, 1823. See Jessup, Reaction and Accommoda-
tion at 258 (cited in note 7). 
1995) PASSWE-AGGRESSWE VIRTUES 87 
thought the Justices used the same tactic in Cohens. The Court's 
ruling in favor of Virginia, a prominent Ohio attorney declared, 
was designed to "allay the apprehensions" that the adverse deci-
sion on the jurisdictional issues was bound to generate in the Old 
Dominion.toz 
III. THE PASSIVE-AGGRESSIVE VIRTUES 
Cohens v. Virginia was not a sound or principled decision. 
The Justices ignored the national purposes of the Grand National 
Lottery and discounted evidence that a lottery confined to the 
nation's capital would be a dismal failure. Defying Herbert 
Wechsler's future injunction that judicial decisions "be genuinely 
principled,"to3 Marshall conveniently neglected to explain why 
the broad principles of national supremacy he relied on in Mc-
Culloch did not entail that the Corporation of Washington or its 
duly authorized agents were constitutionally empowered to sell 
tickets to a congressionally sanctioned lottery in every state of 
the Union. Indeed, Marshall never acknowledged that Virginia 
and Maryland had passed virtually identical laws burdening out-
of-state entrepreneurs. Instead, the Chief Justice treated Vir-
ginia's policy as a general ban on all lotteries while regarding 
Maryland's policy as a tax specifically directed against the Bank 
of the United States. Marshall also interpreted differently identi-
cal provisions of federal laws. The congressional bills chartering 
the national bank and authorizing the Grand National Lottery 
did not explicitly provide for any protection against hostile state 
measures. Nevertheless, the Chief Justice assumed that the Bank 
of the United States was exempt from unfriendly local laws while 
denying that the more public Corporation of Washington en-
joyed a similar immunity from state legislation. 
The structure of Cohens provides the last and most subtle 
example of how Marshall used the passive-aggressive virtues in 
his constitutional opinions. The Cohens opinion first considers 
whether the Supreme Court had the jurisdiction necessary to ad-
judicate the dispute between Virginia and the Cohen brothers. 
Only then did Marshall decide the dispute in favor of Virginia. 
This ordering is hardly unusual. Courts routinely determine ju-
risdiction before considering the substantive merits of a case. In 
Marbury, however, Marshall answered the questions presented 
1~. Luce, Cohens v. Virginia at 122 (cited in note 9) (quoting Charles Hammond); 
see 1d. at 79, 121-22, 241-42. 
103. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1, 15 (1959). 
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by the case in the reverse order. He first asked whether Marbury 
had a right to his commission and then considered whether the 
Supreme Court had the jurisdiction necessary to issue the writ of 
mandamus that Marbury had asked for. Thus, both the Cohens 
and Marbury opinions are structured so as to maximize the 
number of controversial constitutional and political issues Mar-
shall could address before deciding the actual case before him in 
favor of the forces most hostile to the Court. 
Chief Justice Marshall's use of the passive-aggressive virtues 
in Cohens, Marbury and other cases sheds new light on the old 
controversy over the relative influence of law and politics in early 
Marshall Court practice. This debate too often seems indistin-
guishable from partisan squabbles over the relative constitutional 
worth of Hamiltonian Federalism and Jeffersonian Republican-
ism. As a result, disputes over Marshall's legal technique fre-
quently boil down to differences over the substantive merits of 
his decisions. Scholars who would have voted for John Adams in 
the election of 1800 assert that Marshall Court decisions were 
faithful to the constitution and only the constitution. George 
Haskins and Herbert Johnson's Federalist history of the early 
Marshall Court maintains that Marshall "buil[t] a rule of law that 
stood apart and was distinct from the vagarities of changing poli-
tics and the expediences of the moment."l04 Scholars who would 
have voted for Jefferson, by comparison, insist that the Marshall 
Court distorted constitutional doctrine to suit the political prefer-
ences of the Justices. Vernon Partington's Jeffersonian history of 
American political thought describes Marshall as "a judicial sov-
ereign who for thirty-five years molded the plastic constitution to 
such form as pleased him."1os 
The Marshall Court's treatment of the Grand National Lot-
tery suggests a more institutional, less partisan, understanding of 
the Chief Justice's willingness to tailor legal opinions to suit his 
political goals. Marshall was more concerned with politics than 
modem Federalists have thought, but often in a different way 
than contemporary Jeffersonians have claimed. Cohens and 
Marbury reveal a court desperately eager to influence political 
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debate, but astutely aware of its political limitations. Marshall 
and his colleagues relied on the passive-aggressive virtues to 
overcome the Court's institutional difficulties. The main body of 
their opinions proclaim broad principles of constitutional law. 
The last sections, however, decide the case on a fairly narrow and 
questionable statutory or jurisdictional basis, typically in favor of 
powerful government officials. Marbury declares that the presi-
dent is not above the law, but, on very dubious grounds, finds 
that the Court lacks the jurisdiction necessary to order the presi-
dent to perform his legal duties. Cohens declares that federal 
courts have the power to reverse state court convictions, but, on 
very dubious statutory grounds, finds no reason to reverse the 
judgment of the state court in the case before the court.t06 
The central role that the passive-aggressive virtues played in 
Marshall Court jurisprudence challenges the conventional view 
that Marbury "establish[ed] the power of judicial review."t07 
This common assertion is correct if the power of judicial review is 
defined as the power to utter such declaratory sentences as "it is, 
emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, 
to say what the law is."Hl8 By this definition, however, every per-
son who can assert "the death penalty violates the eight amend-
ment" also has the power to declare federal and state laws 
unconstitutional. Presumably, students of the court have some-
thing more than minimal verbal dexterity in mind with they 
speak of judicial review. Power typically consists of something 
like the ability to "get [someone] to do something that [they] 
would otherwise not do."t09 A court possesses power, in this 
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view, only to the extent that judicial decisions (or the threat of 
judicial decisions) inspire or cause government officials and citi-
zens to forego or abandon those practices the Justices believe are 
illegal or unconstitutional. 
When examined from this political perspective, the series of 
decisions from Marbury to Cohens cannot be said to have firmly 
established the practice of judicial review in the United States. 
Marshall Court opinions may have announced bold principles of 
constitutional law, but in cases where the Justices feared hostile 
political forces, they used the passive-aggressive virtues to avoid 
issuing rulings that might antagonize the judiciary's more power-
ful opponents. John Marshall challenged the constitutional 
pretensions of Jefferson in Marbury and Virginia in Cohens. He 
did not, however, order his bitter rivals to perform actions that 
evidence suggests neither Jefferson nor Virginia were prepared 
to do. The Marshall Court tended to declare laws unconstitu-
tional only when, as was the case in McCulloch and Gibbons v. 
Ogden, national and local forces could be trusted to support that 
tribunal's decision.no 
Significantly, the few Marshall Court efforts to exercise judi-
cial power in the absence of strong national support were ignored 
by local officials. Georgia refused to enforce Worcester v. Geor-
gia, Kentucky refused to enforce Green v. Biddle and New 
Jersey refused to enforce New Jersey v. Wilson.tn Early nine-
teenth century politicians failed to comply with federal court or-
ders so frequently that just before Cohens was handed down, an 
Ohio legislator committed to taxing the national bank asked 
how, in light of the general disrespect for judicial rulings at the 
time, their state could "be condemned because she did not aban-
don her solemn legislative acts as a dead letter upon the promul-
gation of an opinion of that tribunal?"n2 Marshall's last letters 
acknowledged the impotence of the court and his apparent fail-
ure to institutionalize his constitutional vision. "I yield slowly 
and reluctantly," he confessed shortly before he died, "to the 
conviction that our constitution cannot last. "113 
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The Marshall Court's experience with judicial review in 
Marbury, Cohens and other cases cries out for a more political 
understanding of how and when that power was established in 
the United States. Rather than focus exclusively on judicial opin-
ions, students of the court must emphasize the broader struggles 
between the partisan forces that supported and opposed the fed-
eral judiciary at different times in American history. Judicial 
opinions and legal ideas will undoubtedly play a significant role 
in this analysis. A tribunal that did not assert the power of judi-
cial review would not have gained the power of judicial review. 
Judicial opinions and practices may also have enhanced the pres-
tige of the Court, thus making defiance more costly for hostile 
political actors. Still, the crucial question constitutional histori-
ans must ask is who those opinions influenced. A revised polit-
ical history of the Supreme Court must identify the political 
forces that promoted the Supreme Court as an the ultimate inter-
preter of the American constitution and explain why these influ-
ential politicians supported John Marshall's institutional 
ambitions. 
Such a political history will probably find that the series of 
decisions from Marbury to Cohens only began the process by 
which the Court established the power to declare federal and 
state laws unconstitutional.l14 Revisionist accounts of judicial re-
view might emphasize the influence from 1810 to 1828 of a pow-
erful nationalist coalition sympathetic to Marshall Court 
jurisprudence,us President Andrew Jackson's decision to 
strengthen the federal court system in the wake of the nullifica-
tion controversyn6 and the attempt of mainstream Jacksonian 
politicians in the 1850s to have courts take the responsibility for 
deciding the constitutional status of slavery in federal territo-
ries.n7 Indeed, scholars may find that the power of judicial re-
view was firmly established in the United States only during and 
after Reconstruction. Late nineteenth century tribunals benefit-
ted from the widespread "cult of the court" among Gilded Age 
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elitesns and the emergence of a "state of courts and parties."n9 
Enjoying the support of powerful political forces, post-Civil War 
Justices could abandon the passive-aggressive virtues. Waite and 
Fuller Court opinions did not simply announce that the constitu-
tion protected the freedom of contract, they ordered hostile state 
officials to refrain from interfering with the right of workers and 
employers to establish the terms of labor in the economic mar-
ket. Despite conventional descriptions to the contrary, the Mar-
shall Court was unable to engage in similarly authoritative 
conduct. 
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